We argue that there is a tension between two types of design arguments-the fine-tuning argument (FTA) and the biological design argument (BDA). The tension arises because the strength of each argument is inversely proportional to the value of a certain currently unknown probability. Since the value of that probability is currently unknown, we investigate the properties of the FTA and BDA on different hypothetical values of this probability. If our central claim is correct this suggests three results: 1. It is not very plausible that a cumulative case for theism include both the FTA and the BDA (with one possible qualification); 2. Self-organization scenarios do not threaten theism but in fact provide the materials for a good FTA. 3. A plausible design argument of one sort or another (either FTA or BDA) will be available for a wide variety of values of the
key probability.
The authors of the above paper are Trent Dougherty, University of Rochester, and Ted Poston, University of South Alabama.
The Consequence Argument is a staple in the defense of libertarianism, the view that free will is incompatible with determinism and that humans have free will. It is often thought that libertarianism is consistent with a certain naturalistic view of the world — that is, that libertarian free will can be had without metaphysical commitments beyond those provided by our best (indeterministic) physics. In this paper, I argue that libertarians who endorse the Consequence Argument are forced to reject this naturalistic worldview, since the Consequence Argument has a sister argument — I call it the Supervenience Argument — which cannot be rejected without threatening either the Consequence Argument or the
naturalistic worldview in question.
The author of the above paper is Jason Turner, Rutgers University.
In this paper I shall explore the parallels and contrasts between scientific and theological realism. I shall start by providing an outline of the various aspects of scientific realism before looking at these in more detail and in comparison to theological realism. I hope that by this comparison with the well-developed debates between various species of scientific antirealists and realists, that some light may be shed on debates concerning realism in theology.
The term ‘scientific realism’ covers a variety of related positions. These may roughly be divided into the metaphysical and the epistemological. The former concerns the subject matter of science. The realist and antirealist may disagree on the correct answer to the question, ‘what is particle physics about?’ Since such questions may be couched in terms of the reference of the key terms of science, we may regard many of the important debates concerning realism as debates about the semantics of scientific terms. Epistemological realists and their opponents take positions on what we can and do know in science or on whether our scientific beliefs are justified. A third area that links with both parts of the realism debate concerns the question, ‘what is the aim of science?’
I shall briefly consider each of these three aspects of the scientific realism-antirealism debate before looking at the parallels in the theological realism-antirealism debate. My conclusion will be that metaphysical antirealism faces many obstacles both in science and theology. If anything the obstacles are greater in theology, even though antirealism is a popular option among theologians. Epistemological antirealism (scepticism, agnosticism, atheism) is better grounded, but in science there are strong responses that do not have theological parallels. Consequently, the theological metaphysical realist is threatened by epistemological antirealism.
The author of the above paper is Alexander Bird, Birkbeck College.
Only one traditional objection to Pascal's wager is telling: Pascal assumes a particular theology, but without justification. We produce two new objections that go deeper. We show that even if Pascal's theology is assumed to be probable, Pascal's argument does not go through. In addition, we describe a wager that Pascal never considered, which leads away from Pascal's conclusion. We then consider the impact of these considerations on other prudential arguments concerning what one should believe, and on the more general question of when and why belief formation ought to be based solely on the evidence.
The authors of the above paper are Gregory Mouginand and Elliott Sober, University of Wisconsin.
On what basis does God choose a possible world to make actual? Theists typically claim that God freely selects exactly one world on the basis of its axiological characteristics. But suppose that (a) there are infinitely-many unsurpassable worlds from which to choose; or else that (b) there are no unsurpassable worlds, but instead an infinite hierarchy of increasingly-better worlds. On each of these scenarios, philosophers have alleged that God is unable to rationally choose a world for actualization. In the former case, God lacks sufficient reason to select any particular world, since there are infinitely-many other equally-good candidates. In the latter case, God lacks sufficient reason to select any particular world, since for any world there are infinitely-many better candidates. These considerations generate arguments for atheism, as follows. On theism, God is supposed to be the explanation for this world’s being actual, and God requires sufficient reasons for action. So, on either scenario (a) or (b), since there is an actual world, it was not actualized by God. In response, defenders of theism have urged that God need not have sufficient reason for choosing a world on (a) or (b): God may defensibly choose a world at random. In what follows, I evaluate this reply. In conclude
that it succeeds only on the enormously-implausible assumption that there is exactly one randomizer available to God..
The author of the above paper is Klaas J. Kraay, Ryerson University.
According to the doctrine of divine simplicity, God is an absolutely simple being lacking any distinct metaphysical parts, properties, or constituents. Although this doctrine was once an essential part of traditional philosophical theology, it is now widely rejected as incoherent. In this paper, I develop an interpretation of the doctrine designed to resolve contemporary concerns about its coherence, as well as to show precisely what is required to make sense of divine simplicity.
The author of the above paper is Jeffrey E. Brower, Purdue University.
In World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism, I argued that there is an important sense in which naturalism’s current status as methodological orthodoxy is without rational foundation, and I argued that naturalists must give up two views that many of them are inclined to hold dear - realism about material objects and materialism. In a review recently published in Faith and Philosophy, Dale Jacquette alleges (among other things) that my arguments in World Without Design are directed mainly against strawmen and that I have neglected to discuss at least one formulation of naturalism that straightforwardly addresses my main objections. In this reply, I show that these and other objections raised by Jacquette are unsound and, in fact, rest on egregious misrepresentations of the book.
The author of the above paper is Michael C. Rea, University of Notre Dame.
According to a widespread tradition in philosophical theology, God is necessarily simple and eternal. One objection to this view of God’s nature is that it would rule out God having foreknowledge of non-determined, free human actions insofar as simplicity and eternity are incompatible with God’s knowledge being causally dependent on those actions. According to this view, either (a) God must causally determine the free actions of human agents, thus leading to a theological version of compatibilism, or (b) God cannot know, and thus cannot respond to, the free actions of human agents. In the present paper, I argue that one can consistently maintain that God is not causally dependent on anything, even for His knowledge, without being committed to either (a) or (b). In other words, an eternal God can know the free actions of agents even if libertarianism is true.
The author of the above paper is Kevin Timpe, University of San Diego.
My goal in this paper is to show that naturalists cannot reasonably endorse moral realism. In defending this conclusion, I mean to contribute to a broader anti-naturalistic project. Elsewhere (Rea 1998, 2002), I have argued that naturalists must give up realism about material objects, materialism, and perhaps even realism about other minds. Materialism aside, I take realism about material objects and realism about other minds to be important parts of our commonsense metaphysics. Likewise, I take moral realism to be an important part of commonsense morality. Insofar as it conflicts with these important parts of our commonsense view of the world, naturalism is unattractive. Of course, one might doubt that unattractiveness counts as evidence against a philosophical position; but, as I’ll explain below, I think that naturalism is not a philosophical position, but a research program. Moreover, I have argued elsewhere (Rea 2002) that naturalism, like any other research program, must be adopted or
rejected solely on the basis of its pragmatic appeal (or lack thereof). It is for this reason that highlighting unattractive features of naturalism is an important way of attacking it.
The author of the above paper is Michael C. Rea, University of Notre Dame.
Eleonore Stump has recently articulated an account of grace which is neither deterministic nor Pelagian. Drawing on resources from Aquinas’s moral psychology, Stump’s account of grace affords the quiescence of the will a significant role in an individual’s coming to saving faith. In the present paper, I first outline Stump’s account and then raise a worry for that account. I conclude by suggesting a metaphysic that provides a way of resolving this worry. The resulting view allows one to maintain both (i) that divine grace is the efficient cause of saving faith and (ii) that humans control whether or not they come to saving faith.
The author of the above paper is Kevin Timpe, University of San Diego.
In this paper we argue that attention to the intricacies relating to belief illustrate crucial difficulties with Schellenberg’s hiddenness argument. This issue has been only tangentially discussed in the literature to date. Yet we judge this aspect of Shellenberg’s argument deeply significant. We claim that focus on the nature of belief manifests a central flaw in the hiddenness argument. Additionally, attention to doxastic subtleties provides important lessons about the nature of faith.
The authors of the above paper are Ted Poston and Trent Dougherty.
In response to the naturalistic and skeptical philosophies of non-theists, J.P. Moreland has offered a bold defense of what he calls “traditional realism”. As an apologist and philosopher, he ably responds to these problematic philosophies. However, the underlying metaphysical commitments and methods of Dr. Moreland are somewhat problematic. One such metaphysical problem deals with the nature of universals. This paper will explain Dr. Moreland’s view of the nature of universals and evaluate his view from a neo-Thomistic standpoint.
Although science studies the natural world and religion seems concerned with supernatural worlds, I shall argue that cognitively speaking it is religion that is natural and science that is largely unnatural.
The author of the above chapter, which appears in Explanation and Cognition, is Robert N. McCauley, Department of Philosophy, Emory University.
There is a long tradition of arguments for the existence of God. Early examples include Aristotle’s cosmological argument in Book Lambda of the Metaphysics, arguing that if there is change, there must be at least one unchanging and perfect being that originates all change, while the first chapter of Romans and chapter 13 of the Book of Wisdom insist that “from the greatness and the beauty of created things their original author, by analogy, is seen” (Wis. 13:5, NAB). This tradition continues, and indeed starting in the 1950s, analytic philosophy has seen an impressive resurgence of more and more careful formulations and criticisms of arguments for the existence of God. I shall show how the phenomenon of altruism yields a theistic argument.
The author of the above paper is Alexander R. Pruss, Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University.
The psychological condition of being happy is best understood as a matter of a person’s emotional condition. I elucidate the notion of an emotional condition by introducing two distinctions concerning affect, and argue that this “emotional state” view is probably superior on intuitive and substantive grounds to theories that identify happiness with pleasure or life satisfaction. Life satisfaction views, for example, appear to have deflationary consequences for happiness’ value. This would make happiness an unpromising candidate for the central element in a theory of well-being, as it is in L. W. Sumner’s work. Yet on an emotional state conception, happiness may prove to be a key constituent of well-being. The emotional state view also makes happiness less vulnerable to common doubts about the importance of happiness, and indicates that mood states are more important for well-being than is generally recognized.
The author of the above paper is Dan Haybron, Saint Louis University.
On one way of putting things, incompatibilism is the view that in some important sense free will (and/or moral responsibility) is incompatible with determinism. Incompatibilism is typically taken to come in two species: libertarianism, which holds that we are free and responsible (andcorrespondingly, that determinism does not hold), and skeptical incompatibilism. The latter includes views such as hard determinism, which hold that we are not free (and/or responsible) and views that argue that free will is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism,
among others. In this paper, I attempt to provide positive arguments against both of the primary strands of incompatibilism.
The first aim of this paper is to take some steps toward filling in an argument that is often mentioned but seldom developed in any detail—the argument that libertarianism is a scientifically implausible view. I say “take some steps” because I think the considerations I muster (at most) favor a less ambitious relative of that argument. The less ambitious claim I hope to motivate is that there is little reason to believe that extant libertarian accounts satisfy a standard of naturalistic plausibility, even if they do satisfy a standard of naturalistic compatibility.
The second aim of this paper is to argue against skepticism about free will without denying the presence of incompatibilist intuitions. Indeed, I am inclined to think that many of us do have incompatibilist intuitions and that they reflect an important aspect of our self-conception. What I
endeavor to provide are considerations for thinking that neither the shortcomings of libertarianism nor the difficulties of standard arguments for free will skepticism are sufficient for embracing skepticism about free will and/or moral responsibility.
I start with some methodological considerations about the aim of theorizing about free will. I then argue for the comparative implausibility of libertarianism, followed by an argument against free will skepticism. The last section of the paper considers the alternatives that remain for those who feel an impulse toward incompatibilism but accept skepticism about libertarianism and skepticism about skepticism about free will.
The author of the above paper is Manuel Vargas, University of San Francisco.
Many theists hold that for any world x that God has the power to actualize, there is a better world, y, that God had the power to actualize instead of x. Recently, however, it has been suggested that this scenario is incompatible with traditional theism: roughly, it is claimed that no being can be essentially unsurpassable on this view, since no matter what God does in actualizing a world, it is possible for God (or some other being) to do better, and hence it is possible for God (or some other being) to be better. In reply to an argument of this sort, Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder offer the surprising claim that an essentially unsurpassable being could – consistently with his goodness and rationality – select a world for actualization at random. In what follows, I respond to the most recent contributions to this discussion. I criticize William Rowe’s new reply to the Howard-Snyders (but I endorse the spirit of one of his arguments), and I claim that Edward Wierenga’s new defence of the Howard-Snyders fails. I conclude that the Howard-Snyders’ argument fails to show that an essentially unsurpassable being could randomly choose a world for actualization. Accordingly, it fails to block an important argument for atheism.
The author of the above paper is Klaas J. Kraay, Ryerson University.
From a contemporary perspective, the work of the Frankfurt School thinkers can be considered the last grand modern attempt to offer transcendence, meaning, and religiosity rather than ‘‘emancipation’’ and ‘‘truth.’’ In the very first stage of their work, Adorno and Horkheimer interlaced the goals of Critical Theory with the Marxian revolutionary project. The development of their thought led them to criticize orthodox Marxism and ended in a complete break with that tradition, as they developed a quest for a unique kind religiosity connected with the Gnostic tradition and emanating, to a certain extent, from Judaism. This religiosity offers a reformulated Negative Theology within the framework of what I call ‘‘Diasporic philosophy.’’ In his later work, Horkheimer explicitly presented Critical Theory as a new Jewish theology. Rearticulating Critical
Theory is of vital importance today, both for understanding the current historical moment and for going beyond the oppressive dimensions of Critical Pedagogy. This article does not satisfy itself by offering a new reconstruction of Critical Theory; its goal is to offer a blueprint for a Diasporic counter-education that transcends Critical Pedagogy and goes beyond the emancipatory dimensions of Judaism itself.
The author of the above article is Ilan Gur-Ze’ev, Faculty of Education, University of Haifa.
Patrick Grim argues that God cannot be omniscient because no one other than me can acquire knowledge de se of myself. In particular, according to Grim, God cannot know what I know in knowing that I am making a mess. I argue, however, that given two plausible principles
regarding divine attributes there is no reason to accept Grim’s conclusion that God cannot be omniscient. In this paper I focus on the relationship between divine omniscience and necessary impossibilities, in contrast to the general trend of research since Aquinas, which has concentrated on the relationship between divine omnipotence and necessary impossibilities.
The author of the above paper is Yujin Nagasawa, Philosophy Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University.
Many theists have tried to work out coherent accounts of the relationship between God and abstract objects. Some have contended that abstracta depend on God for their existence and nature. Following Christopher Menzel and Thomas Morris, I call such a position, 'theistic activism.' In this essay, I begin by examining some motivations for holding such a position. Then, I try to make sense of how abstract objects might depend on God. Finally, I object to theistic activism on the grounds that one who holds to it is committed to the claim that God causes himself to exist and causes himself to have such properties as omnipotence and omniscience.
The author of the above essay is Matthew Davidson, University of Wisconsin.
Two intuitions lie at the heart of our conception of free will. One intuition locates free will in our ability to deliberate effectively and control our actions accordingly: the ‘Deliberation and Control’ (DC) condition. The other intuition is that free will requires the existence of alternative possibilities for choice: the AP condition. These intuitions seem to conflict when, for instance, we deliberate well to decide what to do, and we do not want it to be possible to act in some other way. I suggest that intuitions about the AP condition arise when we face ‘close calls,’ situations in which, after deliberating, we still do not know what we really want to do. Indeed, several incompatibilists suggest such close calls are necessary for free will. I challenge this suggestion by describing a ‘confident agent’ who, after deliberating, always feels confident about what to do (and can then control her actions accordingly). Because she maximally satisfies the DC condition, she does not face close calls, and the intuition that the AP condition is essential for free will does not seem to apply to her. I conclude that the strength of intuitions about the importance of the AP condition rest on our experiences of close calls and arise precisely to the extent that our deliberations fail to arrive at a clear decision. I then raise and respond to several objections to this thought experiment and its relevance to the free will debate.
The author of the above paper is Eddy Nahmias, Florida State University.
This paper elaborates and defends an argument for saying that if God is necessarily good (morally perfect in all possible worlds), then He does not have the maximum conceivable amount of power and so is not all-powerful. It considers and rejects several of the best-known attempts to show that necessary moral perfection is consistent with the requirements of omnipotence, and concludes by suggesting that a less than all-powerful person might still be the greatest possible being.
The author of the above paper is Wes Morriston, Department of Philosophy, University of Colorado.
One of the most important aspects of Alvin Plantinga's paper, and of his religious epistemology generally, is his claim that some Christian beliefs are
properly basic. In what follows, I will very briefly sketch, defend, and present for your consideration an alternative picture according to which Christian beliefs are not properly basic.
The author of the above paper is Keith DeRose, Yale University.
Anselm. (forthcoming inThe Encyclopaedia of Philosophy - second edition.) (pdf)
Anselm of Canterbury (St.) [1033–1109], the greatest philosopher of the eleventh century, was the author of some dozen works whose originality,
rigour, and subtlety earned him the title of "Father of Scholasticism." Nowadays best known for his 'Ontological Argument' designed to prove God's existence, Anselm made significant contributions to metaphysics, ethics, and philosophy of language.
The author of the above article is Peter King, Professor of Philosophy and Mediaeval Studies, University of Toronto. You can also read Anselm's Philosophy of Language by Peter King here. (pdf)
The Paradox of the Stone is a familiar argument that purports to show the incoherence of the notion of an omnipotent God. This paper argues that the paradox loses all force once one accepts two plausible principles regarding the nature of divine omnipotence. The solution to the paradox proposed here is importantly different from the traditional one proposed by such philosophers as Mavrodes, Mayo and Plantinga. The paper also
considers, and rejects, a common strategy for bolstering the paradox, one that appeals to an apparent ability that is lacked by God yet possessed by ordinary folk. It is argued that the strategy rests on an equivocation.
The author of the above paper is Yujin Nagasawa, Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta.
Human rights are in desperate straits around the world. They are widely proclaimed, but brutally violated on a mind-numbing scale. The basic outlook which I wish to represent in this talk is that moral rights depend, for their effective implementation, upon a certain condition in human community. If the community is not one of a high level of moral substance (that is, not predominantly one of morally good people, both in official positions and throughout the population), then moral rights will, at best, degenerate into mere legal rights; and even then they will be continually subject to failure in the context of need, because the individuals involved in such contexts do not act to support them. Those legal rights - where they exist - will also be, at most, honored in the letter, and not in the spirit of human dignity, as Kant and those of similar moral outlook would understand human dignity.
The author of the above speech is Dallas Willard, Professor in the School of Philosophy at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles.
The works of Søren Kierkegaard and Ludwig Wittgenstein are generally conceded to be of seminal importance for their respective fields. But the mention of 'respective fields' already shows that there is a radical gap between the spheres of influence of the two authors.
A systematic consideration of the situation could result in a variety of theories concerning the origin of this gap. For example, it might seem to be justified by the disparity in the two authors' own fields of study. Kierkegaard explicitly claims to be 'a religious author,' insisting that everything he writes must be understood in relation to the problem of 'becoming a Christian.' On the other hand, Wittgenstein is clearly a philosopher: in his works the problems of philosophy are addressed in terms of the relation between language and world. These facts certainly document a substantial difference.
The author of the above essay is Charles L. Creegan.
This study presents a Kierkegaardian perspective on Christian faith and examines its value and relevance for Christians in the midst of "postmodernity." After appraising the less-than-accurate popular conceptions of Kierkegaard's view of faith, the distinctive elements of a Kierkegaardian view of faith are explicated with an eye to their postmodern significance. Finally, this Kierkegaardian perspective on faith will be allowed to interact with that of Alexander Campbell for the purpose of seeing the possible helpfulness of a Kierkegaardian view of faith for those within the Stone-Campbell Restoration tradition.
The aim of this paper is to examine the difficulties that belief in a paradisiacal afterlife creates for orthodox theists. In particular, we consider the difficulties that arise when one asks whether there is freedom in Heaven, i.e. whether the denizens of Heaven have libertarian freedom of action. Our main contention is that this “Problem of Heaven” makes serious difficulties for proponents of free will theodicies and for proponents of free will defences to arguments from evil.
The authors of the above essay are Yujin Nagasawa, Graham Oppy and Nick Trakakis.
This article deals with the philosophical problem of how to conceive reality. The difficulty consists in finding a middle way between the claim that reality is unconceptualised reality and the claim that there is no difference between what is real and what we experience as real. In this regard, the pragmatic tradition in philosophy promises to provide us with some fruitful ideas for steering a path between the two. The author applies some of these ideas in developing a pragmatic realist philosophy of religion which is not reductionist and therefore acceptable for religious as well as non-religious philosophers of religion. First, he gives a very short summary of pragmatism as background to his proposal. Second, in contrast to the notion of realism in the pragmatic tradition he sketches the presuppositions of what is labelled religious or theological realism in present analytic philosophy of religion. Third, he distinguishes between ontological commitments that are metaphysical in character and ontological commitments that are not, drawing on Rudolf Carnap's idea of the difference between internal and external questions of existence. Fourth, he presents Hilary Putnam's criticism of a metaphysically realist conception of existence and fifth, Putnam's defence of what he calls internal realism. Sixth, he puts forward a pragmatic idea of the difference between observational experiences and existential ones in our lives. Finally, he applies this pragmatic philosophy of religion to the question of whether it is reasonable to claim that belief in God presupposes God's existence.
The author of the above essay is Eberhard Herrmann, Uppsala University, Sweden.
Divine Hiddenness: New Essays is a book edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder, and Paul Moser.
For many people the existence of God is by no means a sufficiently clear feature of reality. This problem, the fact of divine hiddenness, has been a source of existential concern and has sometimes been taken as a rationale for support of atheism or agnosticism. In this new collection of essays, a distinguished group of philosophers of religion explore the question of divine hiddenness in considerable detail. The issue is approached from several perspectives including Jewish, Christian, atheist and agnostic. There is coverage of the historical treatment of divine hiddenness as found in the work of Maimonides, St. John of the Cross, Jonathan Edwards, Kierkegaard, and various Biblical writers. A substantial introduction clarifies the main problems of and leading solutions to divine hiddenness. Primarily directed at philosophers of religion, theologians, and scholars of religious studies, this collection could also serve as a textbook for upper-level courses in philosophy of religion.
What, if anything, has Jesus to do with philosophy? Although widely neglected, this question calls for attention from anyone interested in philosophy, whether Christian or non-Christian. This paper clarifies how philosophy fares under the teaching of Jesus. In particular, it contends that Jesus’s love (agape) commands have important implications for how philosophy is to be done, specifically, for what questions may be pursued. The paper, accordingly, distinguishes two relevant modes of being human: a discussion mode and an obedience mode. Philosophy done under the authority of Jesus’s love commands must transcend a discussion mode to realize an obedience mode of human conduct. So, under Jesus’s teachings, we no longer have business as usual in philosophy. The discipline of philosophy then takes on a purpose foreign to philosophy as we know it, even as practiced by Christian philosophers. Under the authority of Jesus, philosophy becomes agape-oriented ministry in the church of Jesus and thus reflective of Jesus himself. In this respect, Jesus is Lord of philosophy.
The aim of this paper is to show that the epistemic force of religious experience is considerably less than Alston makes out in his book Perceiving God. Time and again we see Alston's critics offering what seem to them to be fundamental criticisms of his defense of the rationality of Christian mystical practice (hereinafter CMP) only to be met with Alston's response that the criticisms fail to interpret Perceiving God properly. I hope to show that if we concentrate on how far the arguments of Perceiving God establish Christian theistic realism, then we can break out of this stalemated debate. In particular, I shall examine the stalemated debate between Gale and Alston in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1994 in the hope of showing how it may be developed with profit to our understanding both of Alston's case and of the epistemic force of religious experience.
The author of the above essay is Peter Byrne, Professor of the Philosophy of Religion, King’s College London.
The present essay calls for a readjustment and extension of the field of philosophy of religion as it is conceived by most of its practitioners. Philosophy of religion should not only pursue its old objectives of epistemology, ontology, and philosophy of religious language, to name just these examples, but consider religious phenomena in their entirety, including social and public dimensions. Social philosophy is a major area at the moment. Thinkers such as Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor write extensively on the importance of the public sphere in modern societies, and they even address the role of religion in this sphere. To leave the exploration of the social dimension of religion to social philosophers, historians, and sociologists of religion would be unwise and betrays a truncated view of religion and, thereby, of philosophy of religion. There is more to religion than its cognitive and moral aspects. This essay is an attempt to engage in a dialogue with modern scholarship on religion which rethinks its (re)location in (post)modernity. It is simply not true that the only proper place for religion in the modern world is the private sphere. The emergence of a public sphere since the Enlightenment offers also new opportunities for religion. Philosophers of religion ought to reflect about this kind of transformations.
The author of this essay is Arie L. Molendijk, The University of Groningen.
