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Introduction

Alexander Moens and Martin Collacott

In June 2007, the Fraser Institute held a major conference in Toronto, Ontario, titled, “Immigration Policy, Border Controls, and the Terrorist Threat in Canada and the United States.” As co-chairs of this conference, we introduced the theme and purpose of the conference by referring to recent events: the planned millennium bombing of the Los Angeles Airport and the attacks of September 11, 2001. These two events brought to light how terrorists are able to manipulate the immigration and refugee policies of Western democracies. Subsequent strikes and uncovered plots in Europe, Canada, and other countries have demonstrated the need for us to re-examine the security threats associated with immigration and refugee processing, and the threat that may arise from migrants, new citizens, or the next generation who do not integrate or identify with the values of their new homelands.

While immigrants can make significant contributions to their new countries, the possibility that they may use the host country as a place for recruitment, fund-raising, and a staging ground for terrorist attacks, abroad or in the host country, poses a clear and present danger. The long border and dense trade relationship between Canada and the United States adds to the complexity of managing this threat.

The purpose of the conference was to inform the public by describing the terrorist threat as it truly is. At the conference, we examined and compared the government policies of Canada and the United
States, as well as European countries, that are designed to deal with this problem. Our objective was to analyze strengths and weaknesses in these policies and to formulate recommendations that would provide a better balance between immigration and national security.

The ten chapters in this volume all arose from this conference. We brought together a mixture of Canadian and American experts to address the following issues: terrorist threat assessments; national security and civil liberties; immigration, refugee, and asylum policies; border controls; and Canadian-American initiatives to produce a smarter and more secure border. The chapters reveal that the challenges of dealing with groups or individuals who are planning terrorist acts, recruiting supporters, and providing financial or logistical support to terrorist movements overseas are still very much present in Canada and the United States. The threat has not diminished, and the possibility that determined terrorist groups will at some point be able to find cracks in our armour remains very real.

Most of the authors in this volume (as well as the editors) may easily fall victim to charges of being anti-immigrant, xenophobic, or alarmist with respect to the terrorist threat. But in fact, none of these authors is opposed to effectively managed immigration or allowing genuine refugees who pose no security threat to enter the country through a well-vetted system. All believe that the vast majority of immigrants pose no danger, but are simply seeking to improve their freedom and prosperity. However, given the stakes raised by terrorist attacks, even a small minority of threatening individuals should warrant major attention and policy adjustments. The security issues raised in this volume pertain to the increasing risks posed by Canada’s largely open-ended immigration and asylum systems. In Canada, both systems are heavily influenced by special interest groups and political parties that are vying for political support from limited but influential segments of the electorate. The general principle of immigration and the importance of keeping our borders as open as possible to the movement of commerce are not being challenged. Rather, this volume seeks to demonstrate that the current state of immigration and refugee policies leaves much to be desired from a security perspective.
The purpose of this book is, first of all, to raise awareness among the public and among government officials that Western policies regarding migration, non-integration, and their relation to public safety need to be re-examined. In Canada, trying to open up public debate is a David and Goliath struggle as Canadian academic and non-governmental organization (NGO) elites are nearly universal in their opposition to a critical consideration of immigration issues.

We have organized the issues addressed in this book into four themes. Usually there are one or two Canadian contributors per theme and one American contributor.

Daniel Stoffman, a well-known Canadian writer and author of *Who Gets In: What’s Wrong with Canada’s Immigration Program* (2001), leads off with the first theme (“Mass Immigration and the Growing Threat of Terrorism”) with a chapter that debunks popularly held myths and images of large-scale immigration among Canadians. He questions whether high levels of immigration actually offer solutions to labour market shortages or to the social and fiscal challenges faced by a society with an aging population. Stoffman also describes how immigration patterns in recent decades have changed. He outlines how continuously replenished and increasingly large and less diverse immigrant communities pose greater challenges in terms of integration and security risks, whether sponsoring terrorism abroad (Tamil Tigers) or cultivating home-grown terrorism (Sikh and Islamist). He cites specific examples, such as the terrorist plot discovered in Toronto in 2006, to explain why these trends constitute an acute danger.

Salim Mansur, who teaches political science at the University of Western Ontario, follows Stoffman with an exposé on how the recent threat of jihadist terror has brought to the fore the dangerous nexus between large-scale immigration and limited levels of integration among some immigrant communities in Western societies, including Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. For example, this nexus has created fertile ground for the radicalization of young Muslims by jihadist influence, as the latter has grown into a global network. Liberal democratic societies, which emphasize pluralism,
multiculturalism, and tolerance, have much work to do in finding ways to deal with this emerging threat.

Mark Krikorian, the Executive Director of the Center for Immigration Studies in Washington, DC, demonstrates that intake levels of all categories in the United States are so high that the immigration, asylum, and visa systems are simply overwhelmed. Being overwhelmed means that many of the security checks that should take place do not, and, as a result, potentially dangerous individuals are not detected or prevented from entering. The system overload and subsequent vulnerability, Krikorian asserts, has become an element in the strategy of some jihadist groups who wish to attack the United States.

Under the next theme, “Troubled Immigration and Refugee Systems,” Stephen Gallagher and James Bissett offer detailed accounts of how imperfectly Canada’s refugee policy system actually works. The most obvious flaws—the virtually endless opportunities for review and delay and the near-impossibility, in many cases, of deporting a person whose refugee claim has been rejected—will raise the eyebrows of many readers who are being exposed to these issues for the first time. Gallagher, who teaches at McGill University and Concordia University, shows that the dysfunctional refugee system has, in effect, become a parallel immigration channel through which most claimants are eventually able to become permanent residents and in which immigration eligibility has been replaced by self-selection. He also shows that, in comparison with Great Britain, Australia, the United States, and most other Western democracies, Canadian practices and processes are uniquely lenient.

Bissett, a former Canadian ambassador and Executive Director of the Immigration Service, explains how Canadian politicians are reluctant to fix known flaws in the system for fear of losing votes from immigrant groups. In fact, vote-seeking practices, multiculturalism, and liberal immigration and refugee policies have become very much intertwined. As a result, many politicians have become extremely reluctant to designate certain groups—particularly those with deep roots in ethnic communities—as having terrorist connections if they risk losing electoral support by doing so. Bissett also outlines how
some of the measures taken by Canada in the wake of 9/11 to tighten public security have begun to erode in recent years.

Glynn Custred, a professor emeritus of anthropology at the University of California, East Bay, focuses on the porous southern border of the United States. Just as Canadian elites and governments are reluctant to shore up their immigration and refugee systems, American officials in the Bush administration have been dragging their feet on closing the border to illegal migration. Similar to Krikorian, who argues that the sheer number of entrants must be brought down before some level of security can be re-established in the visa and migration system, Custred believes American authorities must fix the border before any programs to enhance the flow of commerce can be launched.

The next theme in the book, “Balancing Liberty and Security in the New Environment,” addresses the important question raised by many scholars and critics of governmental policies in both Canada and the United States since 9/11 of how basic civil liberties, as well as respect for cultural diversity and openness to newcomers, can be maintained in the face of the new threats of terrorism. Jan C. Ting, a professor at Temple University in Philadelphia, offers a detailed legal and political analysis of why increased security need not permanently reverse or undo civil liberties.

Under the same theme, David Harris sounds the alarm about the imbalanced state of affairs in Canada. As a lawyer, Harris sees only lopsided concerns for civil liberties, multicultural correctness, and a complete lack of threat awareness among Canadian academics and many senior government officials. While intelligence and law enforcement officials may be doing a good job, they are not receiving clear policy guidance from the political leadership. Harris’ plea for a hard-nosed recognition of the jihadist threat to our way of life is aimed at raising public understanding and concern. In his words, “if the government fails to restrict the enjoyment of some liberties in the face of infiltration and growing threats, one might expect to see other liberties ultimately going unenjoyed.”

Stoffman, Gallagher, Bissett, and Harris all point out the short-sightedness of Canadian politicians and political parties in their failing
to address the serious flaws in Canada’s refugee and asylum systems and the lack of security in its immigration system. These authors realize that, in addition to existing systems of patronage and “pork barrel” politics, political parties in democratic countries are continuously seeking new ways of securing electoral support. The issue remains, however, of whether a government can afford to jeopardize national security and public safety for the sake of pursuing votes at nomination rallies and national elections.

The final section of the book, “The Challenge of Strengthening the Canada-US Border,” looks at how these issues impact the border between Canada and the United States. There are a number of other border issues that are not examined in any detail in this book, including the border’s inadequate infrastructure and insufficient manpower to screen the massive flow of trucks that carry over $1 billion in trade every day between our two countries. The main focus of this section is how security, as it relates to migration issues, affects border controls and regimes.

John Noble, a former Canadian ambassador who is now a distinguished senior fellow at Carleton University, describes the various efforts to improve the border and make it “smarter” that the United States, acting alone or in concert with Canada, has taken since 9/11. Likewise, Christopher Rudolph examines the range of initiatives launched in North America recently. Rudolph, a professor in the School of International Service at American University in Washington, DC, argues that there needs to be better cooperation between the two countries in terms of basic intelligence sharing.

Both Noble and Rudolph explain why the European example of open borders (the Schengen Accord) and a common perimeter policy do not provide useful templates for North America. There are too many differences and sensitivities on security and immigration issues to expect much progress on the perimeter concept, beyond joint customs officers in selected ports to inspect inbound container cargo. The American propensity to continue to add additional border enforcement will not provide more security. By the same token, until American authorities are satisfied that Canada will share its assessment of threats
and will act accordingly, the United States will continue to put in place whatever measures it considers necessary on a unilateral basis.

Noble and Rudolph agree that simply increasing security and screening at the Canada-United States border will be enormously costly and will not improve security, per se, as the vast majority of traffic contains no threat. Moreover, the cost to commerce would be prohibitive. Instead, both governments and policy makers must realize that a smarter, more cooperative, and more coordinated perimeter effort is the key to achieving greater border security in the post-9/11 era. Progress thus far under the Smart Border Accord remains modest. What is clear, however, is that, regardless of what challenges the United States faces on its southern border in terms of illegal migration, Canada and the United States need to find more harmonization in security, visa, and asylum measures. Their aim must be to create a system of mutual recognition and shared security criteria, which would alleviate the need for certain border checks and thereby improve the flow without diminishing real security.

In our final chapter, we review the main flaws and weaknesses in Canada’s immigration and asylum systems and their impact on North American security. We evaluate the broad themes raised in this volume and make general recommendations for reform. In closing, we make a call for a comprehensive and independent review of Canada’s immigration and refugee determination systems.
Chapter 1

Truths and Myths about Immigration

Daniel Stoffman

Canada has the highest rate of immigration per capita of any industrialized country (Statistics Canada, 2003: 6). The doctrine that high immigration levels are essential, not only to our prosperity but also to our very demographic survival, has become entrenched in Canada. The combination of these two factors makes it difficult, perhaps even impossible, for Canada to control unwanted immigration. By unwanted immigration, I mean immigrants who pose a threat to the existing population because they are criminals or supporters of organizations that wish harm upon the people of Canada and other Western countries.

Many options for stopping unwanted immigration have been offered. For example, it has been widely acknowledged for more than a decade that the Canadian refugee determination system needs a major overhaul to make it less susceptible to abuse from fraudulent claimants, some of whom pose security risks. A lower acceptance rate, similar to the rates of other refugee-accepting countries, would deter some illegitimate arrivals, as would increased detention of claimants considered unlikely to appear at their refugee hearings and failed claimants considered unlikely to leave the country voluntarily.
Of course, not all immigrants who pose a threat to Canadian society arrive as refugee claimants. Some come through the regular immigration stream. More rigorous scrutiny of immigration applications submitted to Canadian officials abroad would help minimize the number of immigrants who may pose security risks. As well, Canada's new policy of arming border guards, which is being implemented gradually by the federal government, has the obvious benefit of deterring violent individuals who are trying to cross into Canada from the United States.

But none of these reforms would reduce unwanted immigration as effectively as a simple reduction in the annual immigration intake. Because the current immigration level is so high, it is not possible to screen every newcomer thoroughly. Canadian officials cannot always verify that the newcomer actually is who he or she claims to be. As a result, it is inevitable that dangerous people will gain admission.

Generous, yet moderate, immigration levels prevailed in Canada until the annual intake was raised and made permanent by Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservative government in the late 1980s. Successive federal governments have maintained that policy, despite the rise of international terrorist organizations that target Western countries. As a result of this policy, each year 260,000 immigrants enter Canada, a country with a population that is one-tenth that of the United States. If the United States had legal immigration on the same scale, it would be admitting 2.6 million immigrants each year instead of one million (Camarota, 2007).

If Canada were serious about reducing its vulnerability to international terrorism, it would return to the more moderate levels of immigration it once had, similar to the levels that other major immigrant-receiving countries, such as the United States and Australia, maintain. But Canadian governments have tied their own hands by adopting beliefs about immigration that prevent a return to normal levels. Moreover, successive governments have viewed high immigration levels as a winning proposition from an electoral point of view, even though a recent survey indicates that 62% of Canadians want greater restrictions on immigration (Pew Research Center, 2007). Since no Canadian political party advocates a reduction in immigration levels, voters who feel strongly about the issue have no option at the ballot box. Consequently, governments are free to
ignore public opinion. They seem to believe that an expansive immigration policy will please ethnic organizations whose leaders will respond by marshalling support for a government that implements such a policy (Stoffman, 2002: 76–93).

As a result, Canadian immigration policy, once managed in the national interest, is now too often manipulated by politicians seeking re-election. A recent example of this can be found in an internal report prepared by Canada’s diplomatic mission in India, which describes the results of a decision made in 2004 to open a Canadian immigration office in Chandigarh, the capital of the state of Punjab (O’Neil, 2007, Oct. 19). According to Richard Kurland, the Vancouver immigration lawyer who obtained the document, the office was opened to reward Punjabi-Canadians who were clamouring for better immigration services. “Liberals yearned for Indo-Canadian votes, and even though officials advised that Chandigarh was a hotbed of false documents, Liberal politics trumped logic,” he told CanWest News Service. “And now Canada’s immigration system gets to pay the price for Liberal pragmatism” (O’Neil, 2007, Oct. 19).

The price, according to the report, is a flood of fraudulent immigration applications, including many from self-styled nannies with no training. “Fraud is omnipresent in Chandigarh and is found in every sort of document,” the internal report states. “This office has identified over 160 ‘nanny schools’ in the Punjab. While some … are bone fide schools, there are a considerable number lacking facilities, equipment and students—but having large graduating classes” (O’Neil, 2007, Oct. 19).

In 2004, Raj Chahal, who was an advisor to Jean Chrétien while Chrétien was Prime Minister, told The Vancouver Sun that the Chandigarh office was opened despite the objections of both Citizenship and Immigration Canada and the Department of Foreign Affairs. Both departments advised that the resources could be better employed in other parts of India and Asia. The cost of opening the Chandigarh office and then running it for five years was reported to be $25 million (O’Neil, 2007, Oct. 19).

There are a number of false beliefs that are helping to prevent reform of Canada’s immigration policy. The conventional wisdom in Canada is that we are desperate for more immigrants because we have a low birth rate and the boomer generation is getting too old to work. Unless millions
of new immigrants move to Canada, all of us will become poorer because a smaller work force will not be able to sustain the welfare state that supports the elderly at the current level of benefits. The reality, by contrast, is that neither economic nor demographic justifications exist for accepting any negative consequences resulting from the immigration program.

Major studies in Canada, the United States, and Australia have found that, as a fraction of GDP, the economic gains from immigration are minuscule—certainly not large enough to justify maintaining a large immigration program. In a major study, the Economic Council of Canada summed up the Canadian literature as follows: “There is little or no effect of immigration on the per capita income of existing residents” (Economic Council of Canada, 1991: 22). The disconnect between immigration and economic prosperity has been evident throughout Canada’s history. “A historical perspective gives little or no support to the view that immigration is needed for economic prosperity,” the Council stated in its report. “In the 19th and early 20th centuries, the fastest growth in real per-capita incomes occurred at times when net immigration was nil or negative” (1991: 19). An Australian study on the economic effects of immigration by the Committee for Economic Development of Australia supports this finding. It failed to find any significant impact other than that immigration made the overall economy larger (Economic Council of Canada, 1991: 22).

A 1997 study by the National Academy of Sciences on immigration’s impact on the American economy concluded that the fiscal burden of providing government services to new immigrants was greater than any economic gains attributable to immigration (Cassidy, 1997, July 14: 42). The modest gains that immigration does deliver, as American economist George Borjas has demonstrated, are the result of lower labour costs (1999: 87–104). In other words, the most significant economic impact of immigration is the reduction in the costs of goods and services that results from depressing wages. Whether one views this as good or bad depends on whether one is a wage earner or a wage payer. Immigration, Borjas explains, induces a substantial redistribution of wealth, away from workers who compete with immigrants and toward employers and other users of immigrant services (1999: 13). Workers lose because immigrants drag wages down. Employers gain because immigrants drag wages down.
These wealth transfers may amount to tens of billions of dollars each year (Borjas, 1999).

Immigration makes the economy larger because more people are producing and consuming goods and services. But that doesn’t make the average person any richer. It is obvious that no relationship exists between population size and average incomes. If it did, the people in countries such as China, India, and Indonesia would be the wealthiest in the world. However, population growth—or the lack of it—does influence a country’s economic development. Economist David Foot points out that, because of differences in fertility rates, the economies of China and India will develop quite differently in the future. Because China has below-replacement fertility, it will experience worker shortages that will drive wages up. When that happens, China will no longer be a low-cost competitor in the world. “China is going to gradually become a rich country in per capita terms,” argues Foot. By contrast, if Indian parents continue to have three or more children, “there’s always going to be a pool of cheap young labour, so wages are always going to remain low” (Foot, 2007, Oct. 8: 28).

As the work of Borjas, Foot, and others demonstrates, population growth, whether it results from natural increase or immigration, has a powerful impact on wages. Strangely, however, this topic is rarely discussed in Canada in relation to immigration policy. Stranger still, politicians who claim to represent the interests of working people often advocate increasing immigration levels, a policy that would actually increase downward pressure on wages.

A political consensus exists in Canada that extremely high immigration levels are necessary because the Canadian population is aging. However, populations are aging in all industrialized countries—and most developing ones, as well—and yet no other country contemplates a per capita immigration intake comparable to Canada’s. In fact, no evidence exists to support the peculiar Canadian myth that population aging in combination with moderate, rather than high, immigration levels will spell economic doom.

In 2002, Marcel Mérette, an economist at the University of Ottawa, produced a study on the economics of an aging population. He found that investments in human capital—education and training—that
accompanied aging in seven industrialized countries actually increased economic growth more rapidly than would have occurred in the absence of aging. Why? Because a better educated workforce drives technological progress, the real engine of economic growth. Innovation blossoms when resources grow scarce. Just as higher energy costs lead to advances in fuel efficiency, so also does labour-saving technology accompany labour scarcity (Mérette, 2002: 3).

Populations all over the world are aging because fertility is decreasing while longevity is increasing. The notion that immigration is an antidote to the aging phenomenon is simply wrong. Only an astronomical, and entirely impractical, intake of exclusively young immigrants would significantly decrease the average age of Canadians (Stoffman, 2002: 106). Even if Canada were to double its already high immigrant intake, the impact on the average age of the Canadian population would be minimal. Moreover, China and India—the major immigrant-sending countries—are enjoying rapid economic growth and, consequently, are providing good opportunities at home for the same young, well-trained workers that Canada hopes to attract. Thus, in the future, it will be increasingly difficult to attract such people as permanent immigrants.

Canadians will have to accept that Canada, like the rest of the world, is getting older and that this phenomenon is manageable. Other countries, such as Italy and Japan, that are older than Canada have adjusted to an aging population and a slow growing workforce, and have managed to keep the buses running and the hospitals functioning. This has been accomplished through moderate levels of immigration, the education and training of young people, maximized labour participation rates, and increased productivity through the use of technology. Slower labour force growth, concludes Mérette, is offset by greater investment in human capital and rising participation rates. “As a result,” he writes, “growth in the effective labour force may not drop much with population aging” (Mérette, 2002: 12).

There are many examples of successful adaptation to labour scarcity. European countries, which have less available low-cost labour, were a decade ahead of Canada in automating fee collection at parking garages (Stoffman, 2002: 114–115). Another example is the production of grapes to be dried into raisins, one of the most labour-intensive agricultural operations. In
California, bunches of grapes are cut by hand, manually placed in a tray for drying, manually turned, and manually collected. Australia lacks a large supply of cheap farm labour, so farmers developed a method of growing grapes on trellises. This new system reduced the need for labour and increased yields by 200%. This more productive method has been slow to spread to the United States because the availability of cheap labour acts as a disincentive to farmers to make large capital investments (Krikorian, 2004).

Perhaps the most powerful and prevalent economic argument for high immigration levels is the notion that Canada needs a large number of newcomers to do the jobs that Canadians will not do, such as cleaning houses and offices, caring for children and the elderly, and driving taxis. Yet Canadian-born people work in mines, fight fires, and collect garbage. Why would they accept these arduous jobs and yet refuse to do others? The answer is obvious. There is no job that Canadians will not do. However, they expect to be paid well for it and to enjoy good working conditions. When people say that Canada needs immigrants to do the jobs Canadians will not do, they are really saying that Canada wants immigrants because immigrants have no choice but to accept wages and working conditions that no one else will accept. That is not a justifiable use of the immigration program.

An excessive immigration intake does no favour for newcomers to Canada. The economic performance of immigrants has fallen as the number of immigrants has increased. In 1980, immigrants were 1.4 times as likely as Canadian-born people to have low incomes. By 2000, they were 2.5 times as likely to be poor (Picot and Hou, 2003). In 2007, Statistics Canada published a report entitled Losing Ground: the Persistent Growth of Family Poverty in Canada’s Largest City (2007a). It revealed that the number of families with children in Toronto living below the poverty line increased by 9.7% to 92,930 between 2000 and 2005. During the same period, the number of poor families in Canada as a whole shrank by 5.1% (Toronto Star, 2007, Dec. 31). Toronto differs from the rest of Canada in another important way—it receives 40% of all immigrants to Canada (Statistics Canada, 2007b). In the context of the data on falling immigrant economic performance, it is clear that the growth of poverty in Toronto is closely linked to a mismanaged immigration program.
A return to moderate immigration levels would improve the chances for newcomers to become successful in the Canadian economy. It would also bring other benefits, including more manageable growth in major cities, higher productivity, and more rapid per capita economic growth. A more moderate immigration level would also decrease Canada’s vulnerability to international terrorism by making it possible to screen newcomers more carefully. The Canadian government not only lacks the resources to do thorough checks of 260,000 people, it even lacks the resources to check immigrants who come from terrorist-producing regions. In 2006, Jack Hooper, the deputy director of the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS), told the Senate national security committee that 20,000 people had come to Canada from the Pakistan-Afghanistan region since 2001 and that, because of a lack of resources, no security checks whatsoever had been done on 90% of them (Gordon, 2006, May 30).

Immediately after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, travelers shunned air travel. Six years later, planes were filled to capacity and airline profits were soaring (Pae, 2007, Oct. 19). The fearfulness immediately following 9/11 may have been irrational, but there is no reason for Canadians to be complacent merely because six years have elapsed since the attack. Canadians have been victimized by terrorists in the past and there is no reason to believe that they will not be attacked again. In 1985, Sikh terrorists who were based in Canada murdered 329 people, most of them Canadians, by planting a bomb on an Air India jet en route from Canada to India. The attack on the World Trade Center in 2001 killed 24 Canadians. In 2002, Osama bin Laden named Canada one of al-Qaeda’s targets. An al-Qaeda training manual published in 2004 stated, “We must target and kill the Jews and the Christians ... The grades of importance are as follows: Americans, British, Spaniards, Australians, Canadians, Italians” (Bell, 2006, June 3).

Canada’s immigration policies also have consequences for other nations. Ahmed Ressam, the Algerian refugee claimant who intended to blow up the Los Angeles airport, is often cited as an example of how Canada’s laxity endangers the United States. When he was arrested while trying to enter the United States in 1999, Ressam had been living in Canada for five years, even though France had warned the Canadian government
that he was a terrorist and even though he had not bothered to show up for his refugee hearing. During that time, he had travelled to Afghanistan for training and used a false identity to obtain a Canadian passport (Stoffman, 2002: 9). It would be wrong to assume that Ressam was not a threat to his host country, as well as to the United States. During his trial, he testified that he and an associate, Samir Ait Mohamed, had plotted to detonate a bomb in a Montreal area with a large Jewish population, but had dropped that plan to concentrate on the Los Angeles attack.

The most prominent case of an attack on Canadian soil that might have occurred had police not prevented it is the alleged plot of a terrorist cell in suburban Toronto, whose members were arrested in June 2006. Some were Canadian-born, while others were immigrants from various parts of the world, including Egypt, Somalia, and Afghanistan (Bell and Patrick, 2006, June 4). They had allegedly planned to use massive bombs to attack the Toronto headquarters of CSIS and the Toronto Stock Exchange. There was also an alleged plan to attack the Parliament buildings in Ottawa and to behead Prime Minister Stephen Harper. Most of those who were charged lived in parts of suburban Toronto that had significant populations of Muslims. One member of the Muslim community, Mubin Shaikh, played an important role in the arrests of the 18 suspects by acting as an informant to CSIS. In an interview, Shaikh explained his motives: “This is home for me. I can’t have things blowing up in my backyard. There are values that I live by—it’s not that they’re Islamic or they’re Western; it’s that they’re human. That’s what it comes down to” (Le Goff, 2004: 3).

It is natural for immigrants from the same cultural and linguistic backgrounds to settle in the same neighbourhoods. They have always done so. In a free country, people have the right to live where they choose, to speak whatever language they choose, and to maintain their culture. The difference between the current situation and the past is that immigration used to come in waves—a group would come from a particular country, such as Japan or Portugal, and then that influx would stop, either because Canada reduced its immigration quota or because fewer Japanese or Portuguese wanted to come.

This does not happen any more. Canada now has relentless immigration, year after year, from the same places to the same places. As a result,
large self-contained communities are created and are constantly replenished. The majority of the residents of these communities are good people who want to build prosperous lives for their families. Most, like Mubin Shaikh, are law-abiding citizens who abhor violence. But some are not, and the larger a community is, the easier it is for groups that are hostile towards Canada and the West to operate secretly within these communities and to develop support networks.

Canadians rightly pride themselves on the cultural diversity of their major cities, but the reality is that Canadian cities are not diverse enough. Out of 194 countries in the world, just 10 of them account for 62% of all new immigrants. That the majority of immigrants arrive from a small number of source countries is nothing new. During the first major immigration wave between 1867 and 1914, 40% of new arrivals to Canada were from the British Isles (Le Goff, 2004: 3). What is new today is the relentlessness of the immigration flow and its size. In the past, immigration levels fluctuated according to the government’s estimate of the need for new workers. Since the time of the Mulroney government, however, Canada’s policy has been to maintain high levels of immigration, regardless of economic conditions. Moreover, because certain family members of existing residents can enter Canada by right, communities that are already well-established continue to grow rapidly.

Most immigrants leave home in search of better economic opportunities, which is why most source countries are those in which large numbers of young people compete for jobs and earn lower wages. Rich countries with older populations are not significant sources of immigrants. Thus, Italy and Japan no longer send many immigrants to Canada. Eventually, because of demographic changes, the number of immigrants from current major source countries may diminish. But in the meantime, creating a more diverse intake would require a change of policy in Canada. If that were successfully achieved, there might be a larger number of ethnic communities, but they would also be smaller and, perhaps, more integrated into the broader community.

The constant flow of new arrivals from the same places to the same places is not the only hindrance to integration. Another obstacle is the confusing rhetoric surrounding the policy of multiculturalism. Canada
is not really a multicultural country because cultural practices that clash with basic Canadian values are not permitted (Stoffman, 2002: 119–150). Canada is a liberal democracy in which all persons are equal, regardless of gender, race, religion, or sexual orientation. Yet many immigrants arrive imbued with the cultures of countries that are not liberal democracies and do not value or accept individual freedom. In addition, a whole range of practices that are allowed in other countries—such as circumcising young girls, eating dogs, and carrying handguns—are not tolerated in Canada. Yet, because the policy of multiculturalism is so ill-defined, it is understandable that some immigrants are confused with respect to what they can and cannot do (Stoffman, 2002).

Moreover, from a security perspective, the ideology of multiculturalism may hinder law enforcement. Advocates of multiculturalism rightly insist that people of all backgrounds must be treated with courtesy and respect. However, there is a danger that the officials responsible for safeguarding all Canadians will be overly sensitive with respect to linking security issues to the immigration program. If we are afraid to confront problems caused by undesirable immigration, how can we possibly control it?

Martin Collacott (2007, May 8), a retired Canadian diplomat who was responsible for coordinating counterterrorism policy for the Department of Foreign Affairs, believes the sacred cow of multiculturalism may have been partially responsible for the success of the 1985 Air India bombing.

Official multiculturalism policy, with its privileging of tolerance above all else, prevented our authorities from fully investigating and thwarting the terrorists’ plot ... The government’s look the other way policy allowed Sikh militants to intimidate the Sikh community at large ... Even during the Air India trial, supporters of the accused were still able to threaten witnesses for the prosecution.

A striking case of “looking the other way” occurred when those accused of planning to commit various acts of terrorism were arrested in Toronto. Mike McDonell, Assistant Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, claimed that the suspects “represent the broad strata of our society. Some are students, some are employed, some are unemployed” (Austen
and Johnston, 2006, June 4). Based on his remarks, one would expect to find a diverse assortment of people in that group of suspected terrorists—men and women of all ages, from a variety of religious and cultural backgrounds. But in fact, all of the suspects were Muslims, either immigrants or the offspring of recent immigrants, all were male, and all but two of them were in their teens or twenties at the time of the arrests. Several of them attended the same mosque.

In other words, there was little relevant diversity among these suspects. Rather than representing the “broad strata” of Canadian society, these men fit the same narrow profile as those who successfully committed mass murder in the subway in London, the trains in Madrid, and the World Trade Center in New York. Yet McDonell’s attempt to pretend otherwise is understandable. In “multicultural” Canada, racial profiling is unacceptable. Our intelligence and security agencies, argues Collacott, “are being told to operate with one hand tied behind their backs. They will be excoriated if they fail to catch the terrorists and equally lambasted by activists if they show too much zeal in pursuing their leads” (2007, May 8).

If the police are unwilling to state the obvious because they are afraid of offending someone, then the safety of the general public is compromised. Law enforcement officials must feel free to speak frankly about the dangers posed by radical Islamists who think it is right to kill “infidels” anywhere, including the more than 32 million infidels who live in Canada.

Fear of causing offence has also led the media to fail to inform Canadians fully. The Toronto Star, Canada’s largest daily newspaper, refuses to publish the race of suspects being sought by police for criminal acts, although it is doubtful that the Star’s editor, if mugged on the street, would decline to mention the skin colour of his attacker when informing the police. A public opinion poll conducted in February 2007 provides another example of media surrender to multiculturalist sensibilities. The poll found that more than 80% of Canadian Muslims were satisfied with life in Canada and 73% of them thought the terrorist attacks allegedly being plotted were completely unjustified. The headline on the CBC web site read, “Glad to be Canadian, Muslims Say” (Corbella, 2007, Feb. 18). It is not surprising that a majority of Muslims thought the attacks were unjustified. But the real story, which is surprising, was that 12% thought the attacks were justified. This means
that 12% of the Canadian Muslim population of around 750,000–900,000 thought it would be justifiable to explode massive bombs in Toronto and Ottawa, for example, killing thousands of innocent people in the process. By reporting the results of the poll the way they did, the Canadian media tried to shield the public from this information, presumably so as not to embarrass the Muslim community. This is the “see no evil, hear no evil” approach that says, If all immigration is good immigration, then how can there ever be unwanted immigration?

A steady stream of supporters of the Tamil Tigers, one of the world’s most murderous terrorist organizations, have found a haven in Canada. The Tigers, who are fighting to carve a separate Tamil state out of Sri Lanka, are the world’s most accomplished suicide bombers. They have used that tactic to murder a Sri Lankan president and a former Indian prime minister, as well as several moderate Sri Lankan Tamil leaders. Hundreds of ordinary people, who were in the wrong place at the wrong time, also died at the hands of the Tigers—their bombing of a bank building in 1996 killed 90 people (Waldman, 2003, Jan. 14). Rohan Gunaratna, a research fellow at the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews, told The New York Times, “Of all the suicide-capable terrorist groups ... they are the most ruthless” (Waldman, 2003, Jan. 14).

Tiger supporters came to Canada because the Immigration and Refugee Board offered automatic refugee status to anyone who claimed to be a Tamil from Sri Lanka. These claimants didn’t even have to prove that they had ever been to Sri Lanka (Stoffman, 1994). After immigrating, some of them used Canada as a place to raise funds to commit terrorist acts in Sri Lanka (CBC News, 2005, Nov. 30). Nevertheless, federal Liberal governments were so eager to cultivate support among the fast-growing Tamil community that they refused to ban the Tigers as a terrorist organization, even though the United States and United Kingdom had already done so.

When Paul Martin, who would later become prime minister, was criticized for attending a dinner sponsored by a group associated with the Tamil Tigers, he was unapologetic. Such criticism, he claimed, was “not the Canadian way” (Collacott, 2007, May 8). This is one example of how a dysfunctional immigration and refugee system, in combination with
the notion that minority cultural groups must be immune from criticism, makes it difficult for Canada to control unwanted immigration.

Only an infinitesimal percentage of the immigrants and refugees who come to Canada wish us harm. But, as tragic events have shown, it takes only a few to kill and maim thousands. However, Canada can reduce its vulnerability by taking the same sensible approach towards immigration and refugee reform that would be justified even if a terrorist threat did not exist. First, immigration levels must be reduced. All the adverse impacts of immigration, both economic and social, stem from excessively high numbers. The sharp increase in Canada’s intake in the 1990s has been followed by an equally sharp increase in the rate of poverty among new immigrants. Moreover, when a relentless stream of immigrants who speak the same language arrives, self-contained communities are created, integration is impeded, and social division may result. Finally, an excessive immigration intake creates overly rapid growth in the major cities that are the destinations of most newcomers. This growth benefits the real estate industry, but not the population as a whole.

As well, fixing the refugee system would allow Canada to direct more of its resources toward genuine refugees, while deterring fraudulent ones. Because Canada does not share a border with a refugee-producing country, there is no reason why large numbers of claimants should show up at the Canadian border. They come because of what migration experts call the “pull factor.” The ease of gaining refugee status in Canada attracts economic migrants who may not qualify under the regular immigration program or may have to wait for years before being accepted. Because Canada is not close to refugee-producing areas, its role in refugee protection should be to choose from among the millions of people in refugee camps who most need permanent resettlement and bring them to Canada. In 1986, Canada won the United Nations Nansen Medal for its work in resettling thousands of such people. Reducing the pull factor by implementing normal international standards of refugee selection would free up resources that could support an increased focus on such resettlement. As a side benefit, officials could better ensure that these refugees posed no security risks because they would be preselected by Canada.
Immigration is an important national tradition. While immigration is not a prerequisite for economic growth, those who immigrate bring with them new energy and new ideas. Over the past 50 years, they have helped transform the major immigrant-receiving centres of Toronto and Vancouver from dull provincial outposts into cosmopolitan cities brimming with vitality. But because immigration is not essential to economic growth or demographic survival, there is no justification for accepting any negative consequences resulting from the immigration program. One such consequence is an increase in our vulnerability to international terrorism. We can never become invulnerable, but a return to the generous but moderate immigration program that Canada abandoned in the 1990s would make Canada a safer place.
References


